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. 
nder Maryland case law, a plaintiff 
in an estate planning malpractice ac-
tion must be in strict privity with the 
\ ' attorney who drafted the will. To 
~"~ date, Maryland has not extended the 
~~ third-party beneficiary exception to 
the estate planning arena. 
Legatees specifically identified in a will by name or 
class are generally precluded from bringing a cause 
of action against the attorney for the attorney's alleged 
negligence, because in Maryland in order to recover 
for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the 
attorney's employment; (2) his neglect of a reasonable 
duty; and (3) loss to the client proximately caused 
by that neglect of duty." See Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 
730,739 (citing Flanherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 128 
(1985); see also Bradley Fogel, Attorney v. Client-
Privity, Malpractice, and the Lack of Respect for the 
Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate 
Planning, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 261, 267 (2001). 
Maryland is in the minority of states that still ad-
here to the strict privity rule in the context of estate 
planning. Most other jurisdictions have relaxed the 
privity barrier in order to allow a legitimately ag-
grieved beneficiary to have a means of recourse against 
an attorney who planned the distribution of the dece-
dent's estate in a negligent manner. Other jurisdic-
tions following strict privity, have carved out the 
third-party beneficiary exception in the estate-plan-
ning context where the attorney's negligence was "fa-
cially demonstrated" on the will itself. See Hamilton 
v. Needham, 519 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1988). 
In Maryland, a plaintiff in a malpractice action must 
show that the attorney owed a duty of care to the plain-
tiff. Flaherty at 134. The duty of care is generally shown 
by the presence of an attorney-client relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the attorney. In the estate plan-
ning context, the attorney-client relationship is most 
often established between a decedent and the attor-
ney who prepared the will. Because identified will 
beneficiaries are not generally part of the attorney-
client relationship, under Maryland case law they are 
likely precluded from suing the attorney for mal-
practice. The attorney who drafts the will owes a duty 
only to the decedent, who employed The attor-
ney. Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730,752-53 (1998). 
Ms. Vallario is an Assistant Professor at the University 
of Baltimore School of Law. 
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The Court of Appeals has held that an attorney's 
duty is limited to his client because only "[a]client who 
has employed an attorney has a right to his diligence, 
his knowledge, and his skill; and [if] he ... neglected 
to employ them, the law properly makes him liable for 
the loss which has accrued to his employer." Kendall v. 
Rogers, 181 Md. 606,609 (1943) (citing Cochrane v. Lit-
tle, 71 Md. 323 (1889»). Allowing only the person who 
signed the will to sue the estate-planning attorney cre-
ates virtual immunity for those attorneys who make 
mistakes, because any negligence that has occurred, 
will most likely be discovered only after the death of 
the client who signed the will. The testamentary ben-
eficiaries are the persons most likely damaged by the 
negligence, but they will be left without a remedy. 
The personal representative of the decedent may 
have standing to sue; yet there are limited occasions 
upon which this cause of action will result in dam-
ages. Additionally if the negligence is discovered dur-
ing the client's lifetime, the will can be amended without 
harm to the client and with no real liability for the at-
torney. Such mitigation of damage to the client is all to 
the good. 
The cost to the attorney is the preparation of a cod-
icil or new will without further compensation. There 
is the possibility that the client will still be alive but in-
competent, which will preclude correcting the mistake 
by rewriting the will correctly. In that case a guardian 
or an attorney-in-fact could sue the attorney for mal-
practice but damages would be limited to the attorney 
fee paid. See Noble at 759. 
The Court of Appeals has recognized the third-par-
ty beneficiary exception to the strict privity rule in con-
tract cases. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116 
(1985). In Flaherty, third parties, not in contractual priv-
ity with the negligent attorney, stated a cause of action 
for negligent misrepresentation under a third-party 
beneficiary contract theory. The Flahertys contracted 
for the sale of a house and at the settlement, the attor-
ney, Weinberg, assured them that the house they were 
buying was the property as described in the sur-
vey. When a subsequent survey revealed that the prop-
erty purchased by the Flahertys encroached the 
neighboring property, the Flahertys brought suit against 
the attorney, upon theories of negligence and breach 
of warranty. Flaherty at 133. 
In its reasoning, the court acknowledged that a pre-
requisite fbr maintaining an action in negligence against 
an attorney is the existence of an employment rela-
19 
tionship, but that an express agreement 
not necessary in all cases. The strict 
privity rule in the estate planning context 
was most recently addressed by the 
Court of Appeals in Noble, where the 
Court adhered to the strict privity rule 
thus barring the action by the will bene-
ficiaries because there was no "employ-
ment relationship" between the attorney 
and the harmed beneficiaries. 
The Noble Court refused to extend the 
third-party beneficiary exception to the 
testamentary beneficiaries because of the 
lack of communication between the at-
torneyand the beneficiaries and the ben-
eficiaries' lack of reliance on the 
attorney. The Court noted that the testa-
mentary beneficiaries are not per se in-
tended beneficiaries. Noble at 753. The 
Court of Appeals justified its decision on 
public policy grounds aimed at protect-
ing the attorney-client relationship. The 
Court of Appeals found the strict privi-
ty rule protects: (1) the integrity and 
solemnity of the will; (2) the attorney-
client relationship and (3) attorney-client 
confidentiality. Id. at 756-758. 
The Court of Appeals found the testa-
mentary beneficiaries are not intended 
beneficiaries unless "the client's intent to 
benefit the nonclient [is] a direct purpose 
of the transaction or relationship." Id. at 
753-54. The Court further noted that in 
cases involving wills, the beneficiary of 
a will is not necessarily the beneficiary of 
the attorney-client relationship. The 
Court speculated that the testator's in-
tent and purpose in executing a will may 
not be to benefit the beneficiaries named 
in the will, but rather to prevent the in-
testate distribution of assets. Id. at 754 
(emphasis added). 
Moreover, the testator's intent could 
have been to exclude certain heirs or to 
dictate personally the dispositive 
scheme. Id. at 754. In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court considered essential eth-
ical protections of the attorney-client 
relationship and feared that if it did not 
draw a clear line, there would be no lim-
it on the number of people to whom an 
20 
attorney would be obligated. Id. at_. 
In Noble, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land consolidated two separate malprac-
tice actions brought by testamentary 
beneficiaries against the attorney who 
drafted the testator's will. In the first ac-
tion, testamentary beneficiaries brought 
a cause of action of professional mal-
practice against attorneys who failed to 
incorporate a credit shelter trust, in the es-
tate planning for Mr. and Mrs. Long. The 
attorney prepared mirror wills leaving all 
property to each other with a contingent 
provision for the distribution of the estate 
on the death of the survivor. 
The contingent provisions called for 
certain real property to pass outright to 
one daughter; a partial interest in other 
real property passed to Mr. Long's sister; 
with the remainder passing subject to a 
life estate in a son, to their children as joint 
tenants with the right of survivorship. 
Shortly after the death of Mr. Long, Mrs. 
Long as the sole owner of all property re-
ceived pursuant to the above-referenced 
mirror will transferred all real property 
to her sister and son. The remainder ben-
eficiaries' complaint alleged that the at-' 
torney was negligent in rendering poor 
tax advice as estate taxes could have been 
eliminated with the use of a credit shelter 
trust which would have avoided the 
bunching of assets in their mother's es-
tate. Id. at 734. 
In the second of the consolidated cases, 
the attorney prepared Ms. Jackson's will, 
which identified the Fauntleroys as the 
residual beneficiaries. The will also con-
tained a tax provision. The tax provision 
caused $910,000 of taxes to be paid from 
the residual estate. The Fauntleroys filed 
suit against the attorney's estate (because 
the attorney had died) alleging that he 
negligently prepared the will which 
caused all the taxes to be paid from the 
residuary estate. The beneficiaries' posi-
tion was based on the allegation that this 
was contrary to the testatrix's intent. Id. 
at 737. 
In both instances, the alleged negligence 
is questionable and justifies the Court's 
adherence to the strict privity rule. With 
respect to the Longs, the testamentary 
beneficiaries allege that it was negligent 
for the attorney not to incorporate a 
credit shelter trust in the Longs' wills. 
The beneficiaries argued but for the neg-
ligence, the entire estate would have 
passed free of federal estate tax. Al-
though most clients desire to minimize 
federal estate taxes in planning, there are 
a number of non-tax objectives that sim-
ply cannot be achieved with a credit shel-
ter trust. 
For example, in this case, Mrs. Long 
after the death of her husband would not 
have been able to transfer the real prop-
erty if the parties had employed a cred-
it shelter trust in Mr. Long's will. The 
very property Mrs. Long transferred 
would have been trust property held by 
the trustee which would have preclud-
ed Mrs. Long from singlehandedly trans-
ferring the property to her sister and son. 
Furthermore, the attorney testified that 
credit shelter trusts were expressly re-
jected by the Longs because the survivor 
wanted control of the assets during his 
or her lifetime. Additionally, after Mr. 
Long's death, Mrs. Long could have dis-
claimed property she inherited from Mr. 
Long to accomplish the tax savings that 
were forgone by the will that did not in-
corporate the credit shelter trust, but she 
did not. As to the Fauntleroys, the resid-
ual beneficiaries claimed that the attor-
ney was negligent in avoiding the tax 
apportionment statute of Md. Tax Gen. 
§7-308 by including a tax clause having 
all taxes paid from the residuary estate. 
The case for negligence is weak be-
cause there are several reasons for the 
incorporation of a tax clause. With the 
facts in the Fauntleroy case, the Court 
was not willing to speculate as to the tes-
tamentary intent. In Noble, the Court re-
jected a change in Maryland law with 
respect to the strict privity rule in the es-
tate-planning context. In reaching its de-
cision, the Court agreed with the Court 
of Special Appeals' result, but not "all of 
its reasoning," in Kirgan v.Parks, 60 Md. 
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App. 1, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639 (1984); 
Noble at 754. 
In Kirgan, the court held that a testa-
mentary beneficiary has no cause of ac-
tion against the lawyer for alleged 
negligence in drafting the will when: (1) 
the will is valid; (2) the intent expressed 
in the will has been carried out; and (3) 
there was no concession of error by the 
attorney. rd. at 12-13. Thus because the 
Noble facts did not support a Kirgan 
cause of action, the Court applied the 
strict privity rule which prevented the 
testamentary beneficiaries from suing the 
attorney for legal malpractice. What re-
mains unclear is whether the Court 
would carve out a third-party beneficiary 
exception where the beneficiary has 
demonstrated an obvious lack of care and 
skill on the part of the attorney. See 
Hamilton. 
In a District of Columbia case, the tes-
tatrix's attorney failed to include a resid-
uary clause in her will that resulted in a 
testamentary beneficiary being deprived 
of nearly $60,000. While Hamilton's firm 
admitted the omission was negligent, the 
trial court denied recovery to Needham 
due to lack of privity. The Appellate 
Court reversed, holding that the testa-
mentary beneficiary could maintain a 
malpractice action against the drafting 
attorneys despite lack of privity. Hamil-
ton v. Needham, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.c. 1983). 
Upon remand, Needham was 
awarded the money lost due to the neg-
ligent drafting. Hamilton appealed. 
Hamilton raised several issues on appeal. 
His first contention was that the trial court 
failed to require expert testimony on the 
attorney's standard of care. Hamilton, 
519 A.2d at 173. The court answered by 
noting that no complex issue was raised 
that required expert testimony and fur-
ther stated that "a lawyer who admits 
that he omitted from a will a residuary 
clause requested by the testator and 
thereby causes the residual estate to pass 
by intestate succession has facially 
demonstrated an obvious lack of care and 
skill." rd. at 175. 
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Hamilton's next argument was that 
the testatrix had a duty to observe the 
omission, and her failure to do so should 
relieve him of liability. Id. The court dis-
missed his assertion by recognizing that 
the testatrix had a right to rely on Hamil-
ton due to the fiduciary nature of their 
relationship. rd. Finally, Hamilton argued 
that the trial court erred in allowing ex-
trinsic evidence to be admitted to show 
the testatrix's true intent. The court re-
jected this argument stating that with-
out the admission of extrinsic evidence, 
the malpractice claim would be un-
provable, thus leaving Needham with-
out remedy. In a footnote, the court 
refused to adopt the rationale that ex-
trinsic evidence may only be admitted 
to show that the testatrix's intent was 
frustrated. rd. at 175, n. 7. 
. Specifically, the court noted that "[the 
testatrix's will was] silent as to the dis-
position of her residuary estate. There-
fore, a finding that she intended that it 
pass to Needham is in no way contra-
dictory to, nor does it frustrate, the lan-
guage of the will itself. Indeed the 
absence of any residuary clause cus-
tomary in a professionally drawn will 
coupled with a provision that any in-
heritance taxes due be a charge against 
'my residuary estate' provide internal 
evidence within the will itself that some-
thing may be awry." rd. 
Consider the following hypotheti-
cal:An elderly widow visits a Maryland 
attorney to prepare a will for a $150 
fee. The widow's blood relatives include 
an adult son and his daughter. The wid-
ow desires her twenty-five year old 
granddaughter to receive her house, 
bank account, and automobile. The wid-
ow's only son does not inherit under the 
will. The attorney drafts her will, which 
specifically devises her home to her 
granddaughter; bequeaths the cash in a 
SUNlRUST Bank and the automobile to 
the named granddaughter. 
The will does not provide for a con-
tingent beneficiary nor does the will in-
clude a residuary clause. Years pass and 
the widow decides to sell her home and 
relocates to an assisted living commu-
nity. The $150,000 cash from the sale of 
the home is invested in stock with Legg 
Mason. Her eyesight begins to fail and 
she is no longer able to drive so she sells 
her automobile and deposits the pro-
ceeds in her investment account with 
Legg Mason. Finally, she consolidates 
her assets by having her cash in SUN-
TRUST bank moved to a Legg Mason 
money market account. Several years 
go by and she dies. 
Upon her death, the above referenced 
will devises and bequeaths assets that 
are no longer part of her probate es-
tate. Although the will is valid in that it 
satisfies the statutory formalities of Md. 
Code Ann. Est. & Trusts §§4-101; 4-102, 
it fails to dispose of property owned by 
the testatrix. Because the specifically de-
vised and bequeathed properties are no 
longer in existence, the properties adeem 
and the granddaughter receives noth-
ing. Since the testatrix's Legg Mason ac-
count was not disposed of by her valid 
will, the rules of intestate succession con-
trol its disposition. The son as her sole 
heir receives the widow's entire estate 
pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 
§3-103. 
The attorney documents that there 
was a discussion of a residuary clause 
between him and his client, which was 
rejected. Her preference was to iteniize 
her assets and dispose of them as done 
by the will prepared. The question that 
arises is whether the granddaughter can 
bring a malpractice action against the at-
torney for failing to include a residuary 
provision, which provided for her.lf the 
failure to include a residuary clause in 
any will constitutes malpractice (See 7 
Am. Jur.2d Attorneys at Law §§212-253; 
J.A. Bock, Annotation, Liability of One 
Drawing an Invalid Will, 65 A.L.R.2d 
1363 (1959» then does the granddaugh-
ter have standing to sue? If the testa-
mentary beneficiary has standing to sue 
would her recovery be limited to the 
$150 fee? 
21 
One could argue that under Kirgan 
"the intent expressed in the will" has 
not been carried out and thus the grand-
daughter has a malpractice action 
against the attorney for malpractice. Kir-
gan at 12-13 (text item 2). Yet the Mary-
land Courts have stated that "where the 
language of a will is plain and unam-
biguous, extrinsic evidence is not ad-
missible to show that the testator's 
intention was different from that which 
the will discloses, because evidence in-
tended to alter the language of the will 
would violate the statute." Noble at 749. 
Moreover, "extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to show that the testator's 
intent was different from that expressed 
in the will. Attorney malpractice cases 
involving nonclients and arising out of 
will drafting or estate planning require 
special considerations because the tes-
tator is dead. If extrinsic evidence were 
admitted, the potential for fraud and 
the risk of misinterpreting the testator's 
intent increases dramatically." Noble at 
754 (citing Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, 
Shapo, Rosen and Heilbronner, 612 So.2d 
1378 (Fla. 1993». 
In light of the rules of evidence nec-
essary to protect the solemnity of a will 
the hypothetical facts do not support a 
Kirgan cause of action by the grand-
daughter. Kirgan allows a testamentary 
beneficiary to sue the attorney in legal 
malpractice if there is a concession of er-
ror by the attorney. Kirgan at 12-13 (text 
item 3). 
Because the hypothetical attorney 
does not admit any negligence, the tes-
tamentary beneficiary cannot sue the 
attorney. In the estate-planning setting 
where there is an unambiguous valid 
will, as long as the attorney's conduct 
does not escalate to the level of fraud or 
collusion, if there is no acknowledgment 
of negligence on the part of the attor-
ney, the testamentary beneficiary does 
not have standing to sue in Maryland. 
See Noble at 738 (citing National Savings 
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Bank v. Ward, 100 U.s. 195, 205-206 
(1879». 
A distinction can be made between the 
hypothetical facts and the Noble case, 
however, which warrants deviation from 
the strict privity rule. In Noble there were 
plausible explanations for the estate plan-
ning performed by the attorneys. In light 
of the possible reasons for the documents 
to be in their current form, the court was 
unwilling to speculate as to the testa-
mentary intent without the ability to con-
fer with the decedents. If the facts of the 
hypothetical case provide no reasonable 
justification for the attorney's failure to 
include a residuary provision in a will, 
then the failure to include a residuary 
provision in a will constitutes negligence 
for which a legal malpractice action 
should be brought. 
Because the possible negligence was 
discovered upon the death of the testa-
trix, the law should provide protection 
for the testamentary beneficiary who was 
harmed by the negligence and will other-
wise be left without a remedy. In Hamil-
ton, the court stated "a lawyer who 
admits that he omitted from a will a . 
residuary clause required by the testator 
and thereby causes the residual estate to 
pass by intestate succession has facially 
demonstrated an obvious lack of care 
and skill." Hamilton at 175. 
Moreover, the absence of any resid-
uary clause customary in a profession-
ally drawn will coupled with a tax 
provision provide "internal evidence 
within the will itself that something may 
be awry" Id. at_. 
The hypothetical facts are distin-
guishable also from Hamilton in two 
ways. First there was no admission by 
the attorney and secondly there was no 
tax provision. These distinctions might 
not result in a different outcome. 
Extending the third-party beneficiary 
exception to a situation where there is an 
obvious lack of care and skill with no 
plausible explanation for the alleged neg-
ligence would not open the floodgates of 
litigation. There would be a clear limita-
tion concerning the persons to whom the 
attorney would be obligated, and under 
what circumstances the obligation would 
arise. If the courts overcome strict privity 
in situation where the document facial-
ly demonstrates an obvious lack of care 
and skill, the issue of damages arises. Dic-
ta in Noble suggests that if a cause of ac- ~ 
tion were allowed by the testamentary 
beneficiaries that the damages would be 
limited to the attorney fee. Noble at 759. 
In effect that would mean no real re-
covery at all. If the Court extends the 
third-party beneficiary exception to tes-
tamentary beneficiaries where there is 
an obvious lack of care and skill, the '.~ 
Court should entitle the harmed bene-
ficiaries to their actual damages. Current 
Maryland law suggests that no matter 
how heinous conduct of a estate-plan-
ning attorney, the strict privity rule 
shields the attorney. The testamentary 
beneficiaries may be able to file a griev-
ancecomplaintagainsttheattomey.Such 
a complaint will not compensate the ben-
eficiaries, so there is no real remedy for 
the harm caused. 
Perhaps the attorney's conduct in No-
ble did not rise to the level of egregious-
ness necessary to overcome the strict 
privity rule in Maryland. At some point, 
it is hoped the courts will draw the line 
to lift the strict privity rule barrier to re-
lief for a testamentary beneficiary who 
falls victim to the gross negligence of the 
drafting attorney. Although the Court of 
Appeals has not yet carved out the third-
party beneficiary exception needed to al-
low testamentary beneficiaries to sue the 
attorney, it is unlikely that the Court will 
continue to allow the strict privity barri-
er to shelter gross negligence, particularly 
when the estate planning document fa-
cially demonstrates an obvious lack of 
care and skill. 
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